

## 7. VEDANTA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISM

### OBJECTION

53. Some will ask here the following question : Let it be granted that S'aṅkara's system belongs to a hoary tradition, and let it be granted also that all other systems examined in S'aṅkara's Bhāshyas are really faulty. Does it necessarily follow that the method postulated in this tradition is the only Vedantic method that has been universally accepted as such from the remotest times till now ? Is it undoubtedly probable that there were no Vedantic systems other than those that have been noticed in S'aṅkara's works, which may not have been discovered as yet ?

It will perhaps be argued as follows : S'aṅkara's method has been shown to apply to all Upanishadic discussions, and it has been also shown on the basis of universal intuition that this is the only method competent to demonstrate the purport of all Upanishads to be Advaita. And even after this unquestionable conclusion has been arrived at, how can this objection based on the suppositious possibility of some other system having prevailed and disappeared, be put forward just to suspect the authenticity of the only surviving system and its method ?

Our answer is this : This might pass for an argument if it had been universally admitted that S'aṅkara's tradition is the only genuine one that has prevailed down the ages. On the contrary, there are authors of Bhāshya belonging to other schools, who warn us against believing that this way of interpretation started by Gauḍapāda is genuinely Vedantic, since it is only an unenviable imitation of the Buddhists. For instance, *Bhaskarācārya* in his Sūtra-Bhāshya writes :

(1) This much controverted and groundless *Māyāvāda* that has been proclaimed by the Māhāyānic Bauddhas, they adulate and confuse the brains of ordinary people. Bh. SBh. 1-4-25.

(2)[a] That the self-luminous consciousness which projects unreal mental-constructs of the knower and the known superimposed on it, is the only Real Being is the opinion of the followers of *Sugata* overt and covert. S.Tr., p.19.

[b] This theory of reflection (*Pratibimbavāda*) has been already gainsaid in the course of refutation of the views of the crypto-Buddhists. S.Tr. p. 40.

The above extracts are from **Yāmunaçārya's** *Siddhitraya*.

(3) It has been shown convincingly in the course of the confutation of the crypto-Buddhists in the guise of Vedic scholars that those that attempt to prove that pure consciousness alone is real would render themselves the but of ridicule at the hands of all men.

Sri.Bh. 2-2-27, p. 107.

So says **Rāmānujāçārya**.

(4) यच्छून्यवादिनः शून्यं तदेव ब्रह्म मायिनः ।

न हि लक्षणभेदोऽस्ति निर्विशेषत्वतस्तयोः ॥ २४० ॥

That which is the void of the Nihilistic Buddhist is verily the Brahman of the *Māyāvādin*; for there is no differentiating characteristic for either of them, since they are both featureless. VS. Bh. 2-2-8-28.

This is the verdict of Ānandatīrtha (Madhva) pronounced in his commentary on the *S'ūnyādhikaraṇa*.

Again modern research scholars of renown have also opined thus :

(a) In Gauḍapāda's work the state of mind known as the *Vijñāpti-Mātratā* of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins has been adopted under a different name. *Āgama-S'astra* Intro., pp. cxxxii onwards.

says **Vidhushekhara Bhattācārya**.

(b) The distinction of Paramārtha and Vyavahāra views postulated by the Advaitins is very much similar to the distinction of Samvṛtisatya and Paramārthasatya of the Mādhyamikas. The S'unya taught by Nāgārjuna and the Nirguna Brahman are very much alike.

*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. p. 608.

This is the opinion of **Prof. S. Radhakrishnan**.

(c) Gauḍapāda was possibly himself a Buddhist.

*Dasgupta's HIP*. Vol. 1, p. 423.

So according to these scholars also, S'aṅkara's is not the one purely Vedantic tradition that has been in existence from time immemorial.

Therefore, notwithstanding the proven universality of the method of S'aṅkara's system to the detriment of all other traditions, that would not serve as a clincher to convince us that it is not parading in borrowed plumes so long as it is not shown that it is altogether independent of Buddhistic systems whose influence over S'aṅkara's Vedanta has been suspected by so many adverse critics. This is the justification for the new query 'How are we to believe that this is the only system or method that has been handed down by genuine Vedantic tradition ?'

**SUSPICION OF THE ADMIXTURE OF BUDDHISTIC  
DOCTRINE IN THIS SYSTEM**

suspect that Gauḍapāda has adopted certain doctrines of the Buddhists.

We shall first give the Buddhistic teachings and then quote from Gauḍapāda's work where Gauḍapāda has been supposed to have taken the former bodily and presented them as Vedānta :

- (1) अनिरोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम् ।  
अनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागममनिर्गमम् ॥  
यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवम् ।  
देशयामास सम्बुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥

"No annihilation, no origination, no total destruction, no permanance; no identity, no difference; no coming in, no going out. The enlightened one who taught the dependent origination, the dissolver of all variety, the auspicious truth, I bow to him the best of teachers.

MK.V.pp.3-4.

- न बध्यन्ते न मुच्यन्ते उदयव्ययधर्मिणः ।  
संस्काराः पूर्ववत् सत्त्वो बध्यते नैव मुच्यते ॥

The *saṁskāras* of the nature of rising up and immediately disappearing are neither bound nor released. A being is as before, neither bound nor free.

MK. 16-5.

The above two s'lokas are from Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika Kārikās*. Gauḍapāda is seen to use even the very same phraseology when he writes :

- न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।  
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

GK. 2-32.

[This Kārikā has been once quoted under para 51 and translated on page 117.]

Again

(2) यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतः ॥

Like unto a magical appearance, like unto a dream and like unto a phantom - city in the sky, such is origination, such is sustenance and such is dissolution. MK. 7-34.

The above is the Mādhyamika's view. So also has Gauḍapāda equated the world with dream and magician's creation:

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥

Just as a dream or a magical appearance is seen or just as a phantom-city, so is this universe regarded by the adepts in the Vedantas. GK. 2-31.

And in rejecting the reality of causal relation Nāgārjuna says:

(3) न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः ।

उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः कचन केचन ॥

न सन्नासन्न सदसन् धर्मो निर्वर्तते यदा ।

कथं निर्वर्तको हेतुरेवं सति हि युज्यते ॥

"Neither out of themselves, nor from something else, neither from both nor without a cause at all, is anything born anywhere."

MK. 1-7.

"Neither an existing nor a non-existing one, neither both existing and not-existing nor of neither nature is a dharma (thing) caused. How then can we regard it right to postulate a cause producing an effect ?"

MK. 1-7.

And Gauḍapādācārya also says:

स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद् वस्तु जायते ।

सदसत् सदसद्वापि न किञ्चिद् वस्तु जायते ॥

Neither from itself nor from something else is anything born. Neither an existent, nor a non-existent, nor yet something which is of both these natures, is born.

GK. 4-22.

Vijñānavādins say :

(4) अन्यतो नापि चायातं न तिष्ठति न गच्छति ।

नायातः को विशेषोऽस्य यन्मूढैः सत्यतः कृतम् ॥

It has not come from something else, and having come it neither stays nor goes away. What peculiar characteristic is it that induces the ignorant to regard this as real ?

BCA. 9-143.

And this teacher also writes:

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानाद् द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।

कार्यकारणताभावाद् यतोऽचिन्त्याः सदैव ते ॥

They do not issue out of Vijñāna since they are no real things, and there is no causal relation between the Vijñāna and these. For they are always of an inscrutable nature.

GK. 4-52.

The Vijñānavādin says:

- (5) अभूतपरिकल्पोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।  
शून्यता विद्यते तत्र तस्यामपि स विद्यते ॥

Constructive ideation does exist, duality does not exist there. S'ūnyatā exists in it, and in that S'ūnyatā too that idealism exists.

MVB. 1, p.9.

And our Ācārya also says:

- (a) अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।

There is a persistent belief (of its existence); but there is no duality there. GK. 4-75.

And elsewhere, in the clearest terms he insists that there is only *citta* :-

- (b) चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद् द्वयम् ।  
चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥

This duality existing of the knower and the knowable is only the vibration of the *citta*. Therefore *citta* is without an object and untainted by anything foreign. GK. 4-72

Thus it appears that Gauḍapāda is echoing the views of the Māhāyānikas only, sometimes in their very words, and at other times taking their thoughts. And so it seems that it is not an undeserved charge at the hands of other schools that he is considered to be a crypto-Buddhist. How can we then, in these circumstances, regard S'aṅkara's system which follows Gauḍapāda's tradition to be genuine and approved by the Upanishads ? This is a possible query from students of Vedānta.

## REASONS FOR TRUSTING THE KĀRIKĀ-TRADITION

55. It has been already shown on the basis of scripture, reason and intuition that this is the only method employed in the S'rutis throughout. But still those that cannot ascertain the purport of the Upanishads by themselves independently of external authority may not rest assured of this so long as the influence of Buddhism on the system imputed by certain Bhāshyakāras and research-scholars is shown to be groundless. Hence it is necessary to make an attempt to make this acceptable to them also.

In this connection we have to observe that knowers of this tradition have been already cited to show that they all have uniformly employed this very method for ascertaining the purport of the Vedas. It is not proper for those who cannot judge for themselves to lean, for no particular reason, upon opinions based upon recent systems, while they have before them the statements of the ancient knowers of the tradition. Besides there is an additional evidence for believing that the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda represent the traditional Vedantic teaching, viz., that *S'ānti-Rakshita* and other Buddhists cite Gauḍapāda's system as Upanishadic in their works like the *Tattva-Saṅgraha*, for the purpose of examining the tenets of the Upanishad-teaching. It is quite unlikely that Buddhists would treat a teacher who holds their own doctrines as belonging to an opposite camp. Moreover, we have shown in a different section of this work, that Rāmānujacārya and Ānanda-Tirtha (Madhva) have mistakenly regarded the *Āgama-Prakaraṇa*, the first chapter of Gauḍapāda's work to be *S'ruti* itself. Hence it is impossible to suspect Buddhistic influence on that chapter at any rate. For if it were well-known during the time of Rāmānuja to be the production of a crypto-Buddhist, it certainly would not have been quoted by those Vedantic teachers in support



of their own teaching, much less as a *S'ruti*. Hence, even according to these Bhāshyakāras of recent systems, there can be no suspicion that Gauḍapāda, who has been expressly extolled by S'aṅkara in his Bhāshya as the knower of Vedānta tradition, belongs to a foreign school. Sri Gauḍapāda has divided the Māṇḍūkya texts into sections and has introduced his Kārikās in between every two sections with a sentence 'अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति' 'The following verses are in elucidation of this section'. Seeing that traditional Advaitins have been studying the Kārikās in the same order, the authors of Bhāshyas pertaining to other schools, perhaps mistook the kārikās too for portions of the Upanishad, and attempted to explain them also by dextrous display of interpretation so as to suit their own doctrine. And being unable perhaps to twist the other chapters on unreality etc., studied independently by the Advaitins and more expressly establishing Advaita unequivocally, or even to meet the arguments adduced by the *Bhāshya* thereon, they may have begun to pacify their followers by dubbing the Advaitins as crypto-Buddhists. This is the only hypothesis that could explain the phenomenon.

## **1. THE DISPARITY OF THE TWO TEACHINGS WITH REGARD TO REALITY.**

**56.** Let us leave over this argument based upon probability. We can convince ourselves that the Māhāyānic systems Vijñānavāda and S'ūnyavāda on the one hand and the Vedānta on the other, are poles apart from each other, by a direct reference to Buddhistic works by Nāgārjuna and other authors themselves. In these circumstances where is any room for suspecting Buddhistic influence on S'aṅkara's Vedānta for those that are willing to take into consideration the fact of the inability of recent dualist Vedāntins to ascertain the truth of the case as well as their prejudice

against the method of Pure Vedanta ? In order to disclose this truth, we shall first of all exhibit the divergence of procedure with regard to doctrine and dialectic employed by Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda :-

Let us start with a comparison of the two Kārikās of these two thinkers with regard to Reality :

(१) यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवम् ।

देशयामास संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥<sup>1</sup> म.का. वृ. P. 4

It is evident here that Nāgārjuna treats Dependent Origination (*Pratityā samutpāda*) itself as devoid of dissolution and origin, and consequently rejects the reality of Ātman in any sense; for his main tenet is that all *Dharmas* are devoid of distinctive features (*Prapañcōpas'ama*). This has been explained by Chandrakīrti in the same strain :

(1) The import of the word *Pratitya* ending in *lyap* (denoting a perfect participle) is relativity; and the import of the word *samutpāda* is birth, for the root *pad* with the prefix '*samut*' denotes origin. Hence the meaning of the word '*samutpāda*' is origination of things dependent on causes and conditions. M.V. p.2

(2) This same apparent *Pratitya-samutpāda*, not being essentially born, there is no origination in it from the view-point of the Aryas, is being described by the eight attributes beginning with non-dissolution. How *Pratitya-samutpāda* has no dissolution etc. is going to be explained in the entire S'āstra. While an infinite number of characteristics might be ascribed to *Pratitya-samutpāda*, only eight are enumerated here, for it is these that are mainly disputable. When the *Pratitya-samutpāda* is realized as it is by the Aryas, manifoldness such as expressibility is

utterly abolished, and therefore *Pratitya-samutpada* itself is described as *Prapañcōpas'amam* (free from all manifoldness). *Citta* and *Caitya* (mind and mental states) not obtaining there, all ideas of the distinction of knowledge and knowable would cease to exist and consequently it would be altogether free from the evils of birth, decay, death and the like; hence it is *S'iva* (auspicious). M.V.p.3.

It is thus clear that what is described as the auspicious free from all manifoldness is nothing else than *Pratitya-samutpāda* itself. And Nāgārjuna rejects the category of *Ātman* (the Self), and explains that *Pratitya-samutpāda* itself is what has been described as neither one nor many etc. :-

And in the chapter devoted to the examination of *Ātman*, Nāgārjuna says :-

(२) आत्मन्यसति चात्मीयं कुत एव भविष्यति ।

निर्ममो निरहङ्कारो शमादात्मात्मनीनयोः ॥ २ ॥

निर्ममो निरहङ्कारो यश्च सोऽपि न विद्यते ॥ ३ ॥

प्रतीत्य यद्यद्भवति न हि तावत् तदेव तत् ।

न चान्यदपि तत् तस्मान्नोच्छिन्नं न च शाश्वतम् ॥ १० ॥

अनेकार्थमनानार्थमनुच्छेदमशाश्वतम् ।

एतत्तल्लोकनाथानां बुद्धानां शासनामृतम् ॥ ११ ॥

Whence can there be one's own, when there is not one's Self ? One becomes free from the notions of me and mine when the Self and one's own cease to exist. And as to one who is free from the notions of me and mine, even he is not free from the notions of mine and mine.

by something else, it cannot be even that in the first place; nor can it be something else. Hence there is nothing destroyed, nothing permanent. The nectar of the teaching of the Buddhas, the Lords of the world, is neither one nor manifold, neither destructible nor permanent."

On the other hand Gaudapādācārya says basing himself on the S'ruti :

'Free from manifoldness, and auspicious, the Omkār (the Fourth) free from all measures is thus Ātman himself. He who knows thus enters into his own Self, as Ātman.' (Ma. 12)

(२) प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य हृदये स्थितम् ।  
सर्वव्यापिनमोङ्कारं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥  
अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः ।  
ओङ्कारो विदितो येन स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः ॥

(a) *Praṇava* (Aum) should be recognized as the Lord residing in the heart of each and everyone. Knowing *Omkāra*, the all-pervading, the wise one does not lament. Free from measures, immeasurable, free from duality, the Auspicious One, he who has realized this *Omkāra*, he alone is *Muni*, (the thoughtful one), and no other person. GK.1-28, 29.

Thus the *Ācārya* regards the Universal Self himself as indicated by the syllable Aum as transcending the distinction of name and nameable, as the real *S'iva* (auspicious one), *Prapañcōpas'ama* (free from manifoldness). And he observes that 'the ignorant alone regard things of the nature of non-self inseparable from Ātman, as though they were distinct' in the following *Kārikā* :

(b) एतैरेषोऽपृथग्भावैः पृथगेवेति लक्षितः ।

एवं यो वेद तत्त्वेन कल्पयेत् सोऽविशङ्कितः ॥

By these inseparable phenomenal appearances, really inseparable from Him, He seems to be differentiated. He who realizes Him as such, he alone can interpret the Vedas without fear of contradiction.

GK. 2-30.

And he continues to remark as follows :-

(c) स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथा विश्वमिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

GK. 2-31, 32

In the above verses (already translated on pages 126 and 117 respectively.) he declares that Ātman alone is really real, and in Him Prāṇa and other thought-constructs as well as dissolution, origin etc., of the world have been superimposed like dreams, Māyā (products of magic) etc. Hence the utter dissimilarity of the doctrine of oneness of Ātman to the doctrine of the essencelessness of things is crystal-clear.

## 2. DIVERGENCE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS WITH REGARD TO NON-ORIGINATION.

57. Moreover,

न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतः ।

उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः कचन केचन ॥

"Neither out of themselves, nor from other things, neither from both, nor without a cause, are any things ever born anywhere."

MK. 1-1.

[Chandrakirti's Comment : Here the word *Jātu* (ever) means at any time. *Kvacana* (anywhere) is synonymous with *Kvacid* and denotes place. So the verse has to be construed thus : Never, nowhere, are to be found any things born out of themselves. Similarly the other propositions are to be interpreted.]

न सन्नासन्न सदसन् धर्मो निर्वर्तते यदा ।  
कथं निर्वर्तको हेतुरेवं सति हि युज्यते ॥

[The verse has been translated on page 126.]

After thus declaring that the origination of things is impossible in any way, Nāgārjuna says :

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतः ॥

MK. 7-34.

[The verse has been translated on page 126.]

[Chandrakirti : Just as *Māyā* and the like intrinsically never born, and called by the appellations of *Avidyā*, *Māyā* etc., and are the objects of the notions of *Māyā* etc., of the common man, so also these birth etc. only known to the common man but not actually existing have been enumerated by the Lord, just to accommodate to the intellect of the disciples of the same level.]

In the above verses origination, sustentation and dissolution have been emphatically negated, and even after having recourse to the illustrations, *Māyā* (magic), dream etc., even the magician, and the seer of dreams etc., have been likewise negated. Hence it

is clear that absolute non-birth alone is intended to be inculcated by Nāgārjuna.

Gaudapāda on the other hand is strictly a Vedantic teacher who accepts the doctrine of illusory causality - origin, sustentation and dissolution of the universe - to be attributed to the Real Being or Ātman; for he says :

- (a) नेह नानेति चाम्नायादिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि ।  
अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥ गौ.का. ३-२४
- सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः ।  
तत्त्वतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्य हि जायते ॥ गौ.का. ३-२७
- असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते ।  
बन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वापि जायते ॥ गौ.का. ३-२८

"As the Vedas say 'there is' no diversity whatever here' (Bṛ. 4-4-19), 'Indra (the Supreme Lord) through Māyā's (sensuous perceptions due to ignorance) is imagined to be of various forms' (Bṛ. 2-5-19), He the unborn one, is born in diverse ways only illusorily." GK. 3-24.

"Real being indeed, may reasonably have an illusory birth, but not factual. For according to one who believes in factual birth, it amounts to saying that only something already born alone can be born."

GK.3-27.

"For a non-being, there can be no birth either illusorily or factually; a barren woman's son is born neither really nor illusorily."

GK.3-28.

[Here it is emphatically declared that non-being can never have even an apparent birth, while real being may have many illusory births

- (b) सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिविदो लय इति च तद्विदः ।  
स्थितिरिति स्थितिविदः सर्वे चेह तु सर्वदा ॥

"Teachers of creation imagine it to be creation; doctors of dissolution as dissolution, and teachers of sustentation as sustentation. All these (constructions of thought) are in this Reality always."

GK. 2-28.

Here in Gauḍapāda's view even creation etc. are regarded as only superimpositions of thought. Accordingly S'aṅkara writes in his Bhāshya on this verse :

- (c) प्राणः प्राज्ञः बीजात्मा; तत्कार्यभेदा हि इतरे स्थित्यन्ताः । अन्ये च सर्वे लौकिकाः सर्वप्राणिकल्पिता भेदाः, रज्ज्वामिव सर्पादयः, तच्छून्ये आत्मनि आत्मस्वरूपानिश्चयहेतोः अविद्यया कल्पिताः - इति पिण्डीकृतोऽर्थः ॥

"Prāṇa is Prājña, the Self as the seed ; for the other appearances are the effect of that Prāṇa. And all such mundane differentiations imagined by all the Jivas, have been superimposed- like the serpent and other appearances in the rope - on Ātman the Self, free from them, by Avidyā, due to non-determination of the real nature of the Self. This is the sum and substance of the verses recited here." MBh. 2-28

Thus we see that the Vedantic teaching is that the Real Being, the Supreme Self, is the one substrate of all the thought-constructs such as dissolution (*nirōdha*) and origin (*utpāda*) ; whereas the Mādhyamika doctrine is that the imaginary appearances are void of any substrate.

It is true that some of the scholars trained in the modern western way of thinking have a different theory. For they believe that the Mādhyamikas do not teach appearances bereft of a substrate. 'S'ūnya' is no non-being taught by them, but only a



reality beyond the ken of the intellect, named *Prajñā-pāramitā*. The thinghood of things (*dharmāṇām-dharmatā*) is variously described by them as *Prajñā-Pāramitā*, *Bhūtakoti* (the Real entity), *Tathata* (suchness) etc. In my Sanskrit work '*Māṇḍūkya-Rahasya-Vivṛti*' (the disclosure of the secrets of the Mandukya), I have shown at great length how this view is not supported by Nāgārjuna and others. Readers interested are recommended to consult that work for fuller information in the matter. It will be sufficient for our purpose here to invite the reader's attention to the fact that Buddhists themselves have proclaimed in unmistakable terms that the *Prajñā-Pāramitā* itself is like unto *Māyā* (illusory appearance). For instance,

(1) अद्वयज्ञानमेव केवलं भावतो भावरूपमिति निश्चित्य, तदपि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् मायावन्निःस्वभावं तत्त्वतोऽपगतैकान्तभावाभावादिपरामर्शरूपम् इति भावयन् .... ॥

Here it is expressly recommended that the practitioner of spiritual discipline should consider the '*Prajñā-Pāramitā*' (Perfection of Wisdom) of the nature of critical reflection should itself be regarded as the only positive entity, (भावतो भावरूपम्) and even that having dependent origination (प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात्) is essenceless like *Māyā* (मायावन्निःस्वभावम्).

AAA PPL 498-499

(2) यत्र हि नाम निर्वाणमपि प्रतिविशिष्टं धर्मकार्यम् अद्वयज्ञानस्वभावम् मायास्वप्नसमानं वदामि, तत्र किं पुनरन्यं धर्मं रूपकायं न वदामि ? ... यदि निर्वाणादपि कश्चिदन्यो विशिष्टतमो धर्मः संभवेत्, तदा तमपि मायादिस्वरूपं वदेयम् ॥

Here the author says that even *Nirvāna* (the Highest Goal), the *Dharma-kāya*, (the Essential Nature of the Buddha) and even something higher than *Nirvāna* if conceivable, he would proclaim to be like unto illusion and dream (मायास्वप्नसमानम्).

AAA p.144

Besides, it is the half-verse of Dignāga प्रज्ञापारमिता ज्ञानमद्वयं सा तथागतः on which these critics depend for the view that the Mādhyamikas teach Prajñā-Pāramitā as the *prius* of all things. Their translation of this statement is that Prajñā-Pāramitā is non-dual knowledge, and that is the 'Tathāgata'. Even granting this interpretation to be correct, we have shown that *Prajñā-Pāramitā* has itself been regarded as like unto Māyā or magical appearance. And Nāgārjuna himself has declared even Tathāgata to be essenceless. How can we then believe that the Mādhyamikas treat either as real being (परमार्थः) ? This is what Nāgārjuna says :-

- (3) प्रपञ्चयन्ति ये बुद्धं प्रपञ्चातीतमव्ययम् ।  
ते प्रपञ्चहताः सर्वे न पश्यन्ति तथागतम् ॥
- तथागतो यत्स्वभावस्तत्स्वभावमिदं जगत् ।  
तथागतो निःस्वभावो निःस्वभावमिदं जगत् ॥

Here those that regard the Buddha as transcendental undecaying Reality, are all derided as deceived by the manifold universe, not-knowing the Tathāgata as he is. For Tathāgata is really essenceless and the universe is likewise essenceless. MK. 2-2-15, 16

From this it is but right to presume that Nāgārjuna does not approve the doctrine of those who think that *Parinirvāṇa* or absolute *Nirvāṇa* without any trace of body-constituents (*Nirupādhis'asha-nirvāṇa*) can be attained through the suppression of the *Skandhas*. For he says :

- (4) यद्य(दि?)शून्यमिदं सर्वमुदयो नास्ति न व्ययः ।  
प्रहाणाद्वा निरोधाद्वा कस्य निर्वाणमिष्यते ॥

Since everything is essenceless and there is neither origin nor

destruction, then what is it that has to be abandoned or destroyed to get  
*Nirvāṇa* ? MK.25-2

[Here Chandrakirti the commentator writes : Teachers of S'ūnya do not admit Nirvāṇa to be of the nature of the removal of *Kleshas* or *Skandhas*. And again later on he writes in his commentary on the Kārikā सर्वोपलम्भोपशमः (*Sarvopalambhopashamah*) in clearer terms: 'Thus it is established that there is no Nirvāṇa either.']

### 3. DISPARITY IN THE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING REALITY.

58. While origin as such has been effectively disproved by Nāgārjuna by his famous dialectic of four alternatives, he cannot be supposed to have revealed the substrate on which thought-constructs like being have been superimposed. It goes without saying that mere rational refutation of all possible alternatives proves neither the actuality nor its opposite of Reality; nor is it possible to wipe off the reality of a thing by mere negation based upon reasoning. A thing perceived, does not cease to be a thing, even after it is rejected on the score that it has been negated by proving that its existence is not conceivable. This has been declared by the author of the Sūtra-Bhāshya :-

The probability or otherwise of a fact is ascertained by the functioning or not-functioning of some means of right knowledge but the functioning or not-functioning of some means of knowledge is not to be ascertained by the probability or improbability of a fact.

SB. 2-2-28, p.249.

It cannot be argued that this accusation is unjust since Advaitins also reject the authority of Pramāṇas (valid sources of knowledge). For the Advaitins show by reason based upon intuition that the convention of Pramāṇas pre-supposes Avidyā

and Avidyā as the mutual superimposition of the real and the unreal is a fact of universal experience. The Buddhists, on the other hand, do not prove the untenability of the doctrine of the logical canons by any reason based upon universal intuition. Hence there is no parity of reasoning.

But, it may be objected that the Buddhists also recognize the hollowness of the convention of Pramāṇas and therefore even this is a groundless charge. For this is what the Buddhists say :

(१) द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।  
लोकसंवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥

"The Buddhas preach the Dharma by having recourse to two truths, truth as based on the ignorant convention of ordinary life (*Lokasamvṛtisatya*) and truth which is really truth." MK. 24-8.

[Chandrakīrti the commentator says : *Lokasamvṛti-Satyam* is truth according to the ignorant convention of ordinary people. 'All this conventional distinction of the name and the nameable, knowledge and the knowable etc. is called 'Lokasamvṛti Sathya'; for it cannot be really real.]

But this is not right. For the Saugatas say :

(२) यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्ष्महे ।

What is dependent origination, we call that *S'ūnyata*. MK.24-18

For the simple reason that things originate as dependent on conditions, they are regarded as being essenceless. And dependent origination is itself based on ordinary convention. When Nāgarjuna says :

(३) व्यवहारमनाश्रित्य परमार्थो न देश्यते ।

परमार्थमनागम्य निर्वाणं नाधिगम्यते ॥

Reality is not taught without reference to ordinary life, and without knowing Reality Nirvāṇa is unattainable. MK. 24-10.

He really states nothing inasmuch as that which is called Reality is nothing else than what is conventional.

And again their doctrine is :

(४) निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः कोटिः संसरणस्य च ।

न तयोरन्तरं किञ्चित् सुसूक्ष्ममपि विद्यते ॥

The alternative called Nirvāṇa, and that called *Samsāra*, there is not a jot or little of difference between the two. MK. 25-20.

That is to say, *Samsāra* is itself the *Nirvāṇa* and *Samsāra* is in its turn covered up by *Saṃvṛti* of the nature of dependent origination. Hence they have nothing to say touching Reality. Nor can the followers of Nāgārjuna predicate anything concerning Reality, for whatever is predicated could be only S'ūnya or void, for everything is born relatively. He himself says :

(५) यदि काचन प्रतिज्ञा स्यान्मे तदैष मे भवेद्दोषः ।

नास्ति च मे प्रतिज्ञा तस्मान्नैवास्ति मे दोषः ॥

यदि किञ्चिदुपलभेयं प्रवर्तयेयं निवर्तयेयं वा ।

प्रत्यक्षादिभिरर्थैस्तदभावान्मेऽनुपलम्भः ॥

If there were any doctrine of my own, then alone could this blame be laid upon me. But I have no doctrine, and hence no fault can be imputed to me. If I ever perceived anything with perception and other

means of knowledge, then alone there would be some occasion for engaging in some action or abstaining from doing something. But there being no perception etc. whatever, I cannot be blamed for anything.'

V.V. 29,30.

Hence the so-called negation of the phenomenal, is really no negation at all. As the writer of the Bhāshya says :

This ordinary conventional notion in ordinary life, cannot be denied so long as we do not know something else as the real. For a general notion obtains so long as there is no sublation by some other specific knowledge. SBh. 2-2-31, p.252.

We have already remarked that the belief of the modern scholars that the Buddhists make use of synonymous terms like '*S'ūnyatā*', '*tathatā*', '*Bhutakōti*' and '*Dharmadhātu*' all which, according to them, imply a substrate of thought-constructs, is not justifiable.

Nor does Nāgārjuna's statement imply a real substrate of appearances, when he says :

(६) अपरप्रत्ययं शान्तं प्रपञ्चैरुपपञ्चितम् ।  
निर्विकल्पमनानार्थमेतत् तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् ॥

'This is the essence of Tattva : Not known through others, quiescent, not describable by descriptive details, non-discursive and not manifold.'

MK. 18-9.

This, in the light of the previous Kārikā, only purports to say that the essence of things is neither born nor destroyed, and hence it cannot be described in words, but has got to be only intuited by oneself. So does Chandrakīrti explain it :

mosquitoes and flies cannot ascertain the exact nature of those particles etc., even after being instructed by those not suffering from the disease as the latter actually know but being informed by the not-suffering people come to know that they are merely false appearances. When, however, they have got rid of the eye-disease and come to know the truth, then they personally experience the fact. Even so, that which cannot be known through others is the true nature of things. And it is quiescent. That is to say, it is devoid of any essential nature of its own, in the same sense that those not suffering from cataract do not see any particle there. It is not described by *Prapañcas*. *Prapañca* here means speech, for it describes things. So 'not described by *Prapañcas*' means not describable by words. 'Non-discursive', for there is neither *Citta* (intellect) nor the attachments ..... There is no real diversification here; and for what reason ? Just because no things are really born. Thus one must know that lack of diversification is the characteristic of reality; for they are all uniform being essentially void (Sūnya)."

It needs no special mention that here it is merely said that non-origination is the only truth of all things, just like the essence of particles, mosquitoes and other false appearances, but no direct intuition of reality is referred to.

Acārya Gauḍapāda on the other hand refers to the unborn, secondless Reality itself, the Turiya (the fourth) self-resplendent Reality beyond all the three states as described in the S'rutis :

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम् ।

सकृद्विभातो ह्येवैष धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः ॥

"Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, it is verily the self-luminous ever-shining One, this Dharma (Ātman) in his essential nature." GK.4-81

"Those suffering from cataract while seeing unreal particles, mosquitoes and flies cannot ascertain the exact nature of those particles etc., even after being instructed by those not suffering from the disease as the latter actually know but being informed by the not-suffering people come to know that they are merely false appearances. When, however, they have got rid of the eye-disease and come to know the truth, then they personally experience the fact. Even so, that which cannot be known through others is the true nature of things. And it is quiescent. That is to say, it is devoid of any essential nature of its own, in the same sense that those not suffering from cataract do not see any particle there. It is not described by *Prapañcas*. *Prapañca* here means speech, for it describes things. So 'not described by *Prapañcas*' means not describable by words. 'Non-discursive', for there is neither *Citta* (intellect) nor the attachments ..... There is no real diversification here; and for what reason ? Just because no things are really born. Thus one must know that lack of diversification is the characteristic of reality; for they are all uniform being essentially void (Sūnya)."

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"Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, it is verily the self-luminous ever-shining One, this Dharma (Ātman) in his essential nature." GK.4-81



And then he goes on to show that it is impossible to deny by any kind of reasoning that this Reality is beyond all the four logical alternatives inasmuch as it is realized to be such by universal intuition :

अस्ति नास्त्यस्तिनास्तीति नास्तिनास्तीति वा पुनः ।

चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ॥

कोऽथश्चतस्र एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदावृतः ।

भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ॥

"The ignorant man invariably obscures it by regarding it as changeful or steady or both (changeful and steady), or yet again as devoid of both these natures, by imputing to it the notions of (1) 'is', (2) 'is not', (3) 'is, and is not', and (4) 'is neither'. He alone sees everything aright who has intuited that Bhagavān (the Glorious One) untouched by any of these alternative views by adhering to which He is always obscured."

GK. 4-83, 84

The purport of these *S'lokas* is that the Supreme Ātman is beyond all constructs of imagination such as 'is', 'is not' etc. This is endorsed by the S'ruti 'This is the Ātman described as *Neti Neti* (not this, not that); He is ungraspable for no one can grasp Him ....' (Br. 3-9-26). The word Ātman denotes one's own nature, and one's own nature cannot be affirmed that it 'is', or denied by declaring that it 'is not', or doubted whether it 'is or is not' or taking it as being subject to the alternative 'may be thus'; for the Ātman is the very nature of him who affirms, denies, doubts or takes an alternative view. Nay, even its being denoted by the word 'Ātman' or being the object of the notion Ātman, might be denied, but not one's own featureless nature, never and in no wise. Therefore the Acārya's statement that one who has realized his own real nature

free from all alternative views sees the whole truth, is perfectly right.

## CONCLUSION OF THE COMPARISON WITH THE S'ŪNYA DOCTRINE

59. The outcome of the present discussion may be summed up as follows :-

1. The teacher Gauḍapāda bases himself on the S'ruti 'There are no carriages there .....' (Bṛ. 4-3-10) and on reasoning in consonance with it and brings forward reason conducive to intuition to show that the phenomena in both waking and dream being equally restricted to their respective states and not obtaining anywhere else, are equally unreal.

(a) स्वप्नजागरिते स्थाने ह्येकमाहुर्मनीषिणः ।

Dream and waking states are declared by the wise to be one and the same in nature. GK. 2-5.

(b) आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।

वित्तथैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥

That which is neither in the beginning nor in the end, is equally such (i.e. non-existent) in the present also. Things being quite like unrealities appear as though they were real. GK. 2-6.

But the Mādhyamika depends upon mere reasoning and asserts that things are essenceless since they have dependent origination :-

(1) प्रतीत्य यद् यद्भवति तत्तच्छान्तं स्वभावतः ॥

Whatever obtains only relatively is void of nature.

MK. 7-17.

(2) यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

What is dependent origination, that we call *S'ūnyata*.

MK. 24-18.

2. Our teacher raises the question who is it that imagines the things in dream and waking, and who is it that decides their true nature, if as is asserted, dream and waking are both unreal since they are mutually equal in all respects ? In reply he bases himself on S'rutis like 'All the three are dreams' (Ai. 1-3-12), 'He only sees (but does not commit) virtuous and vicious actions' (Br. 4-3-17) verifiable by intuition and says that Ātman alone is the illusory imaginer and he alone determines their true nature.

कल्पयत्यात्मनात्मानमात्मा देवः स्वमायया ।

स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥

It is the conclusion of the Vedāntas that Ātman, the Deva himself misconceives himself through his Māyā, and that it is He alone that determines the true nature of the different phenomena. GK. 2-12

The Mādhyamika on the other hand spurns intuition itself and equally denies the existence of both positive and negative things and basing himself on mere reasoning asserts the non-existence of even the observer of both positive and negative things. He says :

अविद्यमाने भावे च कस्याभावो भविष्यति ।

भावाभावविधर्मा च भावाभावमवैति कः ॥

'When there is nothing positive, of what will the absence be conceivable, and who is it that knows things positive and negative, he himself being unlike both the positive and the negative ?' MK. 5-6.

3. Teacher Gauḍapāda declares all duality as such to be māyic (illusory) in their apparent aspect and Advaitic (non-dual) in their real aspect, on the basis of S'rutis like the following and of reason in consonance with the S'rutis :

The S'rutis he relies upon are 'All this is Brahman itself' (Mu. 2-2-11), 'Being unborn he is born in many ways' (Tai.A.- 3.13-39).

His reasoning is as follows :-

(a) अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्भेद उच्यते ॥

Non-duality is real and duality is a twisting of it. GK. 3-18.

(b) मायया भिद्यते ह्येतन्नान्यथाजं कथञ्चन ।  
तत्त्वतो भिद्यमाने हि मर्त्यताममृतं ब्रजेत् ॥

This unborn One is differentiated only illusorily and not otherwise in any manner. For if it were to be differentiated actually, that which is immortal would become mortal GK. 3-19.

(c) प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः ।  
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥

"If the world actually existed, it could, no doubt, be thought of as disappearing at some time. This duality is in fact only Māyā, in reality there is non-duality alone." GK. 1-17.

But the upholder of S'ūnya on the other hand says that his tradition was started by its founder only for refuting all views

such as dualism or non-dualism and that the special feature of his own philosophy is taking no sides with any of the schools, and ultimately that S'ūnya itself is S'ūnya (essenceless) :-

- (1) सर्वदृष्टिप्रहाणाय यः सद्धर्ममदेशयत् ।  
अनुकम्पामुपादाय तं नमस्यामि गौतमम् ॥

"I bow to that Gautama who took compassion on mankind and taught the good Dharma for the sake of doing away with all views."

MK. 27-30.

- (2) शून्यता सर्वदृष्टीनां प्रोक्ता निःस्तरणं जिनैः ।  
येषां तु शून्यता दृष्टिस्तानसाध्यान् बभाषिरे ॥

The Jinas (Buddhas) have declared that the S'ūnya doctrine is for the removal of all views. But those for whom S'ūnyata is itself a view, the wise ones have declared incurable.

MK. 13-8

- (3) यद्यशून्यं भवेत् किञ्चित् स्याच्छून्यमिति किञ्चन ।  
न किञ्चिदस्त्यशून्यं च कुतः शून्यं भविष्यति ॥

If there were something that was not S'ūnya, then there would be something called S'ūnya. But there is nothing which is not S'ūnya, and so how can there be S'ūnya at all ?

MK. 15-7.

Such being the case there can be no comparison whatever between the Mādhyamika who asserts the essenceless of all things, and of the denier of the essence of those things and of the denial also, in short, of even S'ūnya itself as having any essence,

- (4) निर्मितको निर्मितकं मायापुरुषः स्वमायया सृष्टम् ।  
प्रतिषेधयते यद्वत् प्रतिषेधोऽयं तथैव स्यात् ॥

Just as a *Nirmitaka* (one created by supernatural powers) would deny a *Nirmitaka*, and a magician created by magic would deny what he has created by magic, this my denial would be of the same nature.

VV. 23.

[The gloss hereon : 'so also my words which are S'ūnya may very well deny the essential nature of all things.']

there can be no comparison whatever between such a Mādhyamika, we repeat, and one who teaches the non-dual principle of Brahman which is the Self of all and the substrate of thought constructions like the illusory knower, knowledge etc.. as taught in the Upanishads. No one would attempt to institute such a comparison unless his intellect were warped by bias or misconception.

## VEDANTIC VIJÑĀNA CONTRASTED WITH BUDDHISTIC VIJÑĀNA

60. This should suffice to reject the comparison of Vedanta with the doctrine of Vijñāna also of the Buddhists. In the first place, it should be remembered that the teacher Gauḍapāda begins his chapter on *Alātas'ānti* (extinction of the firebrand) with the sole purpose of showing how the unborn secondless principle of Ātman is revealed by the mutual disputation of philosophers each of whom is biased in favour of his own school. He therefore refers to the doctrine of the Non-dual Ātman in the very benedictory verse to that chapter. And in particular, at the close of the exposition of his own system he expressly contrasts the Advaita philosophy which he favours, with the Vijñānavāda taught by the Buddha.

Thus at the commencement in the S'lōka

(1) ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान् यो गगनोपमान् ।

ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥ गौ.का.४-१

he distinguishes the *Advaitavāda* (doctrine of Non-dualism) from the *Vijñānavāda*. (doctrine of Vijñāna-consciousness as Reality) as well as from the *S'ūnyavāda* (or doctrine of essencelessness of things).

Now the *S'ūnyavādins* say that *Jñāna* (or knowledge) is as essenceless as ether; and the *Vijñānavādins* say that Vijñāna is untainted just because it has no object, that the external objects are really no more than consciousness itself, inasmuch as they are only the momentary consciousness transformed and so they do not exist independently by themselves. It is therefore to exclude both of these views that it is asserted here that the only reality underlying the knower, knowledge and the knowable is the ever-changeless Pure Consciousness and the former have no independent being of their own. The revered author of the *Bhāṣya* has stated this in so many words :

"Expression of obeisance to the teacher involves the subject-matter of the present chapter, to wit the propagation of the principle of *Paramātmān*, the Supreme Self free from the distinction of knowledge, the knowable and the knower, through the refutation of the counter-positions." GK. Bh. 4-1, p. 228.

And at the close of the chapter Gaudapāda says :

(2) क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ।

सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥

The knowledge of a Buddha (wise person), the Tāyin (the all-pervading one) does not pass over to objective things. So also all *dharmas* (selves), and knowledge as well. This has not been taught by the Buddha. GK. 4-99.

And this has been explained by the author of the Bhāshya as follows :-

"For the knowledge of a Buddha, i.e. a knower of the truth, does not pass over to *dharmas*, i.e. external objects, in the same way as the light of the sun never leaves it. The epithet *Tāyin* has to be etimologically explained thus :- One who has *taya* is '*tāyin*'. *Taya* is continuity; so the attribute means one who pervades all without any break like the all-pervading ether. Or the epithet may mean the revered one, or one who possesses the highest wisdom. So also are all the *dharmas* or Ātmans ; they being all-pervading like the ether no less than knowledge itself, never pass over to any of the objects external to them. What was stated at the commencement of the chapter in the proposition 'He who knows the ether-like *dharmas*, by means of ether-like knowledge' etc. is concluded here by saying that the knowledge of the enlightened one does not pass over to anything other than itself, and so are all the *dharmas* or selves. This principle of the Brahmātman is immovable like the ether, changeless, without parts, eternal, secondless, untainted, invisible, ungraspable, and beyond hunger and other evils, for the S'ruti says 'There is no disappearance for the sight of the seer' (Bṛ. 4-3-23).

This secondless Reality without the distinction of knowledge, knowable and knower has not been taught by the Buddha, while it is true that he has rejected the external objects and enounced the theory of the sole reality of knowledge - a theory proximate to that of the secondless Reality. This Absolute, the secondless Reality, however, is to be known from the Upanishads alone." MBh.4-99



[Hereby the statement that 'consciousness does not pass on to external objects' the independent existence of the knowable is rejected; by the epithet '*tāyinaḥ*' the essential nature of Consciousness without break has been brought home. The so-called individual Ātmans also here denoted by the word '*dharmas*' are said not to pass on to anything external, in order to disclose their identity with the Supreme Self. And consciousness has been declared to be not distinct from its locus, the Ātman, just as the light of the sun is not distinct from the latter.]

Recent Vijñānavādins explain the significance of the epithet '*tayin*' by interpreting '*tāya*' as 'the teaching of the way discovered by him' or 'the revelation of the four noble truths' (Pr. V. 2-146, 147); but here '*tāya*' has been taken to denote continuous all-pervasiveness or having the nature of ether-like all-pervasive consciousness. This doctrine is peculiar to Vedānta, because even according to Vijñānavāda, Buddha has never spoken of the omnipresence of the knower, knowable, or of knowledge as pure secondless consciousness. This tenet is in accordance with the *S'ruti* 'He is omnipresent and eternal like the ether (?)', and the *Smṛti* 'By which all this is pervaded' (G. 2-17). As for the statement in the Bhāṣya that the Buddha has taught something 'proximate to the secondless Reality' it should be taken only to refer to reason which explains away the conventional distinction of consciousness and the object perceived on the strength of the sole reality of consciousness without assuming the independent reality of the external objects. For basing ourselves on the self-same line of reasoning we can show how, treating the momentary Vijñāna also as comprehended by the category of the objective, all convention of the means of knowledge and the knowable is likewise the creation of the ignorance of the Ātman whence the corollary might be deduced of the sole reality of the Secondless Entity, the highest good, free from manifoldness. It is this idea at bottom that prompts

S'aṅkara to make the abovementioned observation, and not the mere dialectical need or justification for the rejection of the external objects in the face of common experience. For this Vijñānavāda has been refuted at great length in the Sūtra-Bhāshya.

### DISSIMILARITY IN THE METHOD OF REJECTION OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT IN THE TWO SYSTEMS

61. The Buddhists who support the Vijñānavāda say :

अन्यतो नापि चायातं न तिष्ठति न गच्छति ।

मायातः को विशेषोऽस्य यन्मूढैः सत्यतः कृतम् ॥

"It never came from something foreign, neither stays nor goes away; how does that differ from Māyā (magical appearance), which has been taken by fools to be real ? BCA. 9-143.

With regard to this position, teacher Gauḍapāda makes the following remark : If it is meant to emphasize the sole reality of the mind, and the absence of anything external to it which is the occasion of its corresponding mental variations, then by parity of reasoning, it will have to be admitted that just as consciousness appears to be a pot or something else even in the absence of the latter, so also the pure Ātman appears through Avidyā to be the mind even when while there is no mind at all in truth :-

(1) तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते ।

तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जातिं खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥

For the same reason, there is no mind born, just as there is no object born. Those who see its origin, can surely see the trail of birds

[Here the *Bhāshya* says : 'Since according to the *Vijñānavādin* the *Citta* appears as though it were a pot etc. even while there is no pot or some other thing, we confirm that inasmuch as it is in accordance with fact. Therefore it stands to reason that even the birth of the mind must be an appearance only even while there is no actual birth of it.]

And even with regard to the argument that unreal things only appear as though they existed independently just as they do in dreams and magic shows, *Gauḍapāda* says :

- (2) स्वप्नदृक् प्रचरन् स्वप्ने दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।  
अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वापि जीवान् पश्यति यान् सदा ॥  
स्वप्नदृक्चित्तदृश्यास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।  
तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं स्वप्नदृक्चित्तमिष्यते ॥  
चरञ्जागरिते जाग्रद्दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।  
अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वापि जीवान् पश्यति यान् सदा ॥  
जाग्रच्चित्तेक्षणीयास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।  
तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं जाग्रदचित्तमिष्यते ॥

The egg-born or the sweat-born creatures which a dreamer moving about sees in all the ten directions, are all of them objects seen by the *Citta* (mind) of the dreamer alone, and as such do not exist apart from it. In like manner this *citta* of the dreamer is considered to be object seen by that dreamer alone. And the egg-born or sweat-born creatures which are moving about always seen in all the ten directions, all of them being the object of the waking mind, do not exist apart from it. In like manner the mind of the waking person should be considered to be the object of that waking person only."

GK. 4-63 up to 66 inclusive.

[Here it is stated that the mind in dream and that in waking are different and distinct, and that the seer of the mind is distinct from it in each case on the basis of intuition. And the identity of the witnessing self for both the states is also postulated on the strength of the S'ruti 'That by which both the dream and the waking are witnessed' (K. 2-1-4) which is likewise supported by universal intuition.]

The Kārikās cited above accept the equal unreality of both dream and waking in accordance with the S'ruti 'these are the three dreams' (Ai.) and reveal the dissimilarity of the Vedantic system from the doctrine of Vijñāna. In the Sūtra-Bhāshya, however, it has been held that the similarity of waking to a dream or magic adduced by the Vijñānavādin on the basis of mere reasoning is itself open to question :-

(3) "For there is dissimilarity between a dream and waking. And what is this dissimilarity ? We reply 'sublation and non-sublation'. The thing seen in a dream as we know, is sublated for the person who is awakened thus 'I falsely seemed to meet a great crowd of people; there was no actual meeting for me of the crowd of people; but my mind was overpowered by sleep and hence there was this delusion'. There is similar sublation in the cases of magic and other states, as appropriate to each of them. On the other hand there is no sublation of the thing seen in waking in any other state." SBh. 2-2-29, p.250.

It cannot be objected that on this supposition, the unreality of phenomena cannot be established even by the Vedantin. For we do admit this at the level of empirical views. This implication is just what we hold to be true, to wit, that there is the distinction of the Real and the unreal in the waking state. For the S'ruti says 'The real became the real and the false (of practical experience)' (Tai. 2-6). From the stand-point of Reality, however, not merely the mind and its object, but all non-self subjective as well as

objective, is unreal in every respect. This has been demonstrated in the *Vaitathya* Chapter.

Thus, there being no example supporting the inference, the proposition that the external object is not different from *Māyā*, and that it does not come from somewhere else falls to the ground. *Ācārya Gaudapāda* on the other hand, first shows how dream and waking are perfectly identical in nature, and then draws our attention to the fact that both of them disappear in sound sleep and after this appeal to universal intuition only he concludes :

एवं न जायते चित्तमेवं धर्मा अजाः स्मृताः ।

एवमेव विजानन्तो न पतन्ति विपर्यये ॥

Thus the *citta* is never born, and thus are all *dharmas*, unborn. Only knowing thus people do not fall into error. GK. 4-46.

Whereby the non-origination of the mind, and the identity of all individual selves as the unborn secondless Reality become quite clear. And this thinker describes the unborn unchanging Consciousness by the epithet '*Vijñāna*' and writes :-

विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः ।

न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान्न विज्ञानं विशन्ति ते ॥

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानाद् द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।

कार्यकारणताभावाद् यतोऽचिन्त्याः सदैव ते ॥

As *Vijñāna* vibrates indeed the apparent forms do not come from something else, nor do they go away elsewhere when it ceases to vibrate, nor do they merge in the *Vijñāna* itself. They have not come out of *Vijñāna* since they are not real entities and there is no relation of cause

and effect (between Vijñāna and the appearances). For they are inscrutable for all times. GK. 4-51, 52.

The meaning is that the illusory forms make their appearance in the waking and dream states when the Vijñāna vibrates owing to Avidyā, while Vijñāna itself remains in its own nature as absolutely changeless Consciousness.

Here we should not suspect similarity of reasoning in the two systems with regard to the rejection of external things just because of the word Vijñāna employed in both of them. For in the one case the object of *Citta* alone is rejected, while in the other both *Citta* and its object are declared to be inscrutable illusory forms essentially one with the unborn secondless Consciousness in conformity with reasoning based on intuition.

### MERE EMPLOYMENT OF THE WORD 'CITTA' DOES NOT ENTAIL SIMILARITY

62. It is sometimes supposed that Gauḍapāda confirms Buddhistic doctrines when he employs expressions like 'अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति' (There is predilection for the non-existent GK.4-75), and 'चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं' (this is no more than vibration of *Citta* GK4-72).

This position too may be considered to have been rebutted from what has been already said on this subject. For the first half of the Kārikā of Maitreyanatha, the Vijñānavādin is

अभूतपरिकल्पोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।

[For the Kārikā complete see p. 128]

And *Sthiramati* explains it as follows :

‘न खलु अभूतपरिकल्पोऽपि न भवति, Constructive ideation indeed cannot

be said to be non-existent. It is to be understood in the same way as a rope which is free from the nature of a serpent - not being of that nature it is always devoid of it, but not of the nature of a rope.... . That which is devoid of something else is existent, that of which it is devoid is not there."<sup>1</sup> MVBT., p. 12-13.

Here *Citta* itself is *abhootaparikalpa* (the substrate of the thought-construct) because it is that in which the distinction of the perceiver and the perceived are falsely imagined to exist. Gauḍapāda on the other hand, says that being relative to each other neither the *Citta* nor its objects (the individual souls etc.) independently exist, either in waking or in dream (GK. 4-67), and all the *Jivas* are merely the false constructs of *citta* like dream-selves or *Māyic*-selves, or selves created by means of Yogic power (GK. 68, 69, 70) and concludes with the same doctrine that has been propounded in the chapter on Advaita (GK. 3-48) in the following *Kārikā* :-

न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः सम्भवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।

एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किञ्चिन्न जायते ॥

No Jiva is ever born, there is no cause of his birth. This is the highest Reality where nothing is born, not even a jot. GK. 4-71.

[*Bhāshya* :- Empirically speaking, it has been stated 'the birth, death etc. of souls are like those of souls in dream etc. The Highest Reality, however, is that wherein no Jiva is ever born.]

Immediately subsequent to this comes the *Kārikā*

चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद् द्वयम् ।

चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥

---

This duality consisting of the knower and the knowable is only the vibration of the *Citta*. Therefore *Citta* is without an object and untouched by anything foreign. GK. 4-72.

Now this *Kārikā* taken along with the other in the chapter on Advaita,

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ।

तथा जाग्रद्द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ॥

"Just as the mind vibrates illusorily in dream as though it were divided into two, so also the mind vibrates illusorily in waking as though it were divided into two." GK. 3-29

can only culminate in the *Ātman* doctrine. Therefore it is clear that the half verse

अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।

'There is persistent belief (of its existence), but there is no duality there' GK. 4-75.

can only purport to say that duality is imagined to exist in the changeless *Ātman* by wishful predilection, but cannot actually exist there. We can therefore have no scent here of *Vijñānam* of the Buddhists which can thrive only in waking.

### NOT EVEN THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE TERM 'LŌKŌTTARA' CAN ENGENDER THE SIMILARITY OF THE SYSTEMS

63. There is another plausible point of similarity surmised by some critics. The *Yōgācāra* Buddhists have made the following remark :



(1) "Thus overpowered by the impression of the slumber of superimposing unreal appearances, man sees as in a dream a non-existing thing without realizing its non-existence while yet not awake. When, however, he is awakened by attaining the *lōkōttara* non-discursive knowledge which counters that idea then being confronted with the *s'uddha-laukika-jñānam* subsequent to it, he realizes the true nature of objects just as they are. So this is just like waking from a dream and seeing things in their true light."

Vim. 17, p. 109.

Just the same technical terms, *Loka*, *S'uddha-Laukika*, and *Lōkōttara* that have been used by Vasubandhu have been used by Gaudapādācārya also in the following :

सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते ।

अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥

अवस्त्वनुपलम्भं च लोकोत्तरमिति स्मृतम् ॥

GK. 4-87, 88

Hence, it is alleged, that this is the same as the *Yōgācāra-Vijñānavāda*. Such bold research scholars would not hesitate to proclaim that the thousand-rayed sun has borrowed his light from the fire-fly just because there is the epithet *Khadyota* (shining in the sky) common to both of them. For the word '*Lōkōttara*', according to the *Yōgācāras*, denotes a particular *samādhi*, while for the teacher Gaudapāda it signifies deep sleep devoid of the distinction of the perceiver and the perceptible. The *Yogācāras* recognize the distinction of degrees of knowledge, whereas no degrees of sleep are recognized by Gaudapāda. Nor is it even possible to conceive any degrees in that state. Moreover, Vedantins hold that the absence of duality is common to both sleep and *samādhi*. The author of the *Sūtra-Bhāshya*, as is well-known, has written as follows :

Even after the normal abolition of distinctions is attained in sleep, samādhi etc., the distinction reappears as before on awaking because false knowledge has not been cancelled. SBh.2-1-9, p. 191.

## DEPENDANCE ON YŌGA AND THE ABSENCE OF IT SHARPLY DISTINGUISH THE TWO SYSTEMS

64. Another point of difference. While in the Vedantic tradition Yōga of the nature of *manōnigraha* is recommended to aspirants at the medicore stage, yet the resultant of that Yoga is of no particular degree but only the no-mind state of the mind due to intuition of its identity with Brahman. Even when the Vijñānavādin accepts the sole being of Vijñāna as is referred to in the following verse :

यदा त्वालम्बनं ज्ञानं नैवोपलभते तदा ।

स्थितं विज्ञानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहात् ॥

When, however, consciousness has no object at all, then it remains only as pure *Vijñāna* because it does not perceive there being no perceptible. Trim. 28.

even then, it is impossible to conceive the absence of the object. According to Vedanta on the other hand Ātman is taken to be always unknowable in the light of the S'ruti 'By what, my dear, can the knower be known ?' (Br. 2-4-14), *samādhi* is nothing else but Ātman's remaining in the nature of self-effulgent Consciousness beyond the range of both speech and mind. So says Gauḍapada in his Kārikā,

(1) सर्वाभिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासमुत्थितः ।

सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽभयः ॥

Beyond all speech, above all thinking, absolutely quiescent, eternal light and fearless unperturbed Samādhi. GK. 3-37.

Even the control of the mind (मनोनिग्रह) is taught here as culminating in merging in its own nature as Ātman.

(2) यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।  
अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥

When the mind does not become dormant, nor projects itself again, when it is neither shaky nor shows itself in some objective form, then it has become Brahman. GK. 3-46.

That is why Advaitic insight is eulogized as the Yōga free from all contact :-

(3) अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः ।  
अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥

I bow to the well-known *Aspars'a-Yōga* (intuition free from any contact) which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial to all, free from controversy, and opposed to none. GK. 4-2.

The Advaitic knowledge being of the nature of secondless intuition is the essence of Brahman only and therefore is called the *Aspars'a-Yōga*. This alone is 'Yōga' in its primary sense, as contrasted with Yoga recognized by the other school, for this latter is only a temporary trance. The particles 'Vai' (well-known) and 'Nāma' (so called) are intended to bring home that this knowledge is well-known by that appellation to all knowers of Brahman. For the S'ruti says 'there what would one perceive and with what?' (Br. 4-5-15). 'It is the happiness of all', it is really that which all

beings unwittingly feel as happiness, as is vouched for by the S'ruti 'It is a particle of this Bliss that other beings live upon' (Br. 4-3-32). 'Beneficial' for the S'ruti and the Smṛuti say : 'You yourself kindly choose for me what is most beneficial to man' (Kau. 3-1), 'I am telling you in view of what is beneficial to you' (G. 10-1).

Moreover this Advaita-Jñāna is 'free from controversy and opposed to none'. In the same way as this *Aspars'a-Yōga* is free from the contact of duality, conduces to the happiness of all beings, as it is of the nature of bliss itself and really beneficial because only by attaining this one can get eternal contentment, so also only this knowledge is free from controversy just because there is no opposition to any one else in this state of realization. This is because this Ātman is the very self of every controversialist. We know that the Sāṅkhyas, Vais'eshikas and others on the one hand, and the Buddhists who are divided in their doctrines such as the existence of all external things, the sole reality of Vijñāna (consciousness) or the essencelessness of all things on the other, cannot be expected to free themselves of mutual opposition or controversy with one another at any time.

True, the Mādhyamikas too consider that their giving up of all views leads to the cessation of controversy, for they too cite such s'lokas as the following : "This is the cause of dispute, viz. to persist in the existence or the non-existence of Reality" - अस्तीति नास्तीति विवाद एषः (SR. 9-28), "If existence by nature were true, then there would not be non-existence of it" - यद्यस्तित्वं प्रकृत्या स्यान्न भवेदस्य नास्तिता (MK. 15-8), but yet they cannot avoid controversy with the Vijñānavādins and others who affirm that things do have an essential nature, since they are all opposed to these other schools and since they can never get rid of the belief of the existence of an opposite disputant so long as they propose to criticize the views

of all others by means of a logical dialectic. No doubt the Vijñānavādins maintain that their intuition of the absence of all objects other than Vijñāna-consciousness is incontrovertibly arrived at by means of the *Lōkōttara-Prajñā*, but the samādhi which they recommend being an individual intuition, cannot escape the possibility of being sublated by some other intuition. Not so with regard to the Advaitic intuition, for even the suspicion of the possibility of a second sublating intuition is warded off here by reasoning based upon universal intuition. So says Ācārya Gauḍapāda :-

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः ।

योगिनो बिभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ।

This Yoga called the Aspars'a - Yōga (Yōga of non-contact) is not accessible to all Yōgins. For Yōgins are afraid of this, seeing fear where there is none. GK. 3-39.

[There is no fear here, because it is secondless non-duality.]

That is why adepts in Vedānta say :

"The knower of Vedic truth safely rests in truth, for he has left all that occasion for opposition with the controversialists only, and they themselves safeguard this view of Pure Being."

## CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRAST

65. The sum and substance of the present discussion is this :

1. The Vijñānavādin takes up for examination only consciousness limited by the waking state. He says :

यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तु बहिर्वदवभासते ।

सोऽर्थो विज्ञानरूपत्वात् तत्प्रत्ययतयापि च ॥

Because of its being of the nature of Vijñāna and appearing only as its object, the knowable which is really inside appears as though it were outside." A.P. 6.

and holds that the seemingly external object is really within. Gauḍapāda, however, concedes the reality of both knowledge and the knowable in the conventional field in the waking state though both *citta* and the object thereof are each to be assumed to exist relatively to the other.

(a) उभे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते किं तदस्तीति नोच्यते ।

Both of them are mutually dependent for their being; which shall we say is really existent ? GK. 4-67.

(b) सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते ।

The duality-with the objective thing and perception of it- is *Laukika* (the waking state which is the field of conventional procedure). GK. 4-87.

His own view of Reality, however, is that it is distinct both from empirical consciousness and its object, and the essential nature of each one of us is Consciousness without a second and unborn.

(c) अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानमिष्यते ।

यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥

The knowledge of the unborn selves is, we maintain, unborn,

and never passes on to any object. Inasmuch as this knowledge never goes out to something else, it is said to be untainted. GK. 4-96.

[The meaning is knowledge as Pure Consciousness is one with the knower and has no object.]

2. The Vijñānavādin maintains that perception in the waking state is an illusion no less than dream perception, since it has no external object :

प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः स्वप्नादौ यदा सा च यदा तदा ।

न सोऽर्थो दृश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं कथं मतम् ॥

In dream and other states also there is the experience of the notion of perception. And when we experience it, there is no object already seen there. Such being the case, how can we say there is perception of it ? Vim. 16.

And according to him just as there is no dream-object perceived on waking, so also the absence of objects in waking is known by the *Lōkōttara* (Samādhi) knowledge. Gaudapāda on the other hand says (reasoning on the lines indicated in the s'lōkas 4-87 to 89) that while there is knowledge or the semblance of it appropriate to waking or dream, they are equally absent in the *Lōkōttara* (deep sleep) state. The Vijñāna (Pure Consciousness) by which both of them and their absence are intuited is alone the eternal omniscient consciousness, and it neither wakes nor dreams; nor does it depend on the experience of *Samādhi* or any other state. For one who has known its nature as it is, Reality as Ātman, no such aid is possible or needed.

(d) अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम् ।

सकृद्भिभातो ह्येवैष धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः ॥

Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, it is verily the self-luminous ever-shining One, this Dharma (Ātman) in his essential nature. GK. 4-81.

- (e) अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमनामकरूपकम् ।  
सकृद्विभातं सर्वज्ञं नोपचारः कथञ्चन ॥

Unborn, sleepless, dreamless, without name, and without form, shining once for all, and all-knowing. There is nothing else to be done any wise. GK.3-36.

3. According to the Vijñānavādin one is awakened from the waking-state, as one gives up a dream on awaking. According to Gauḍapādācārya on the other hand one has got to be awakened from the illusory dream of the three states, and that waking is not due to attaining any particular *samādhi* but to the realization of the sole reality of Ātman caused by the teaching of a teacher expert in the knowledge of Vedānta. Witness the following Kārikā :

- (f) अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।  
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥

When the Jiva awakes from the beginningless illusory dream-sleep, he realizes the secondless Reality unborn, beyond sleep and beyond dream. GK. 1-16.

[That the word dream signifies both dream and waking is clarified in the Bhāshya here.]

Here we are told that in the Consciousness which is changeless and uniform in nature, devoid of all specific features, there is neither the impurity of any appearance of objective things, nor any purification by way of washing off the impurity by the enlightenment got by *samādhi*, or some other means. There is neither the seed-sleep of ignorance nor the dreamful-sleep of